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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
SLOVITER, Circuit Judge. 
 
Appellant, Peter W. Hirsch, Director of Region Four, on 
behalf of the National Labor Relations Board ("NLRB" or 
"the Board"), appeals from the district court's order denying 
a temporary injunction under S 10(j) of the National Labor 
Relations Act ("NLRA"), codified at 29 U.S.C. S 160(j). The 
injunction was sought pending the resolution by the NLRB 
of unfair labor practice charges against appellee Dorsey 
Trailers Inc. The district court concluded that a S 10(j) 
injunction would not be "just and proper," the statutory 
standard for an injunction under the NLRA. The Board 
timely appealed. The International Union of United 
Automobile, Aerospace and Agricultural Implement Workers 
of America, Local 1868 ("UAW" or "the union"), which is the 
bargaining representative of the workers affected by the 
denial of injunctive relief, has filed a brief amicus curiae in 
support of the Board's appeal. 
 
We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. S 1291, 1292(a)(1) 
and 29 U.S.C. S 160(j). Our review of the denial of a S 10(j) 
injunction is for abuse of discretion, see Eisenberg v. 
Lenape Products, Inc., 781 F.2d 999, 1003 (3d Cir. 1986), 
and we have held we may reverse the denial of a S 10(j) 
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injunction if the factual findings do not "substantially relate 
to the conclusion reached" by the district court. Kobell v. 




This appeal centers on the circumstances surrounding 
the December 1995 closure of a plant in Northumberland, 
Pennsylvania, that once employed 200 UAW workers who 
manufactured dump and flatbed trailers for Dorsey. The 
facts set forth below are taken from the record and, unless 
noted, are not in dispute, although the exact dates are not 
always clear. In February 1995, Dorsey and the UAW began 
negotiating a new Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) 
because the prior CBA was due to expire in March 1995. 
The primary issues concerned overtime and subcontracting. 
Dorsey warned that if no agreement could be reached or if 
the union were to strike, Dorsey would close the plant. App. 
at 47-49. Negotiations were conducted between February 
and May but the parties were unable to reach agreement on 
a new contract. 
 
The union began a strike on June 26, 1995, to protest 
alleged unfair labor practices of Dorsey. App. at 50. On 
June 30, 1995, the union filed the first of four unfair labor 
practice charges against the employer. In September 1995, 
Dorsey began to negotiate for the purchase of a new plant 
in Cartersville, Georgia, and on October 5, 1995, reached a 
basic agreement in principle to purchase the plant. App. at 
145-46. It had concluded that it would be to its financial 
benefit to operate the Georgia plant rather than the 
Northumberland facility. App. at 138-41. On October 9, 
1995, Dorsey notified the union of its impending purchase 
and its intention to move the Northumberland work there. 
However, it also offered to continue to bargain over the 
"effects of that decision and the decision itself." App. at 
189. Thereafter, the union unconditionally offered to come 
back to work but by then Dorsey was seeking substantial 
concessions. App. at 164. Further negotiations proved 
fruitless. Dorsey described the union's concessions on 
overtime as "too little too late." App. at 66; 177. 
 
On November 9, 1995, Dorsey formally notified the union 
of its decision to close the Northumberland plant and move 
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its operations to Georgia. At that time, Dorsey began 
moving the plant equipment. App. at 181. On November 16, 
1995, the union filed the fourth of its unfair labor charges 
against Dorsey alleging that Dorsey improperly transferred 
work to the Georgia plant. The union asked the Board to 
seek temporary injunctive relief under S 10(j), but the Board 
did not act on the request at that time. Dorsey shut down 
the plant on December 29, 1995, and has attempted to sell 
it since then. App. at 252-53. 
 
There was a lapse in Dorsey's operations resulting from 
the move, and it began its Georgia operations in March 
1996. When it determined that it could not manufacture at 
the new plant all of the trucks that it had manufactured at 
Northumberland, Dorsey decided it would limit its Georgia 
plant to the manufacture of flatbed trailers. In July 1996 it 
purchased a South Carolina facility to build dump trailers, 
previously manufactured in Northumberland. 
 
Dorsey estimates its total costs of moving the 
Northumberland operations to Georgia and South Carolina 
exceeded $900,000, app. at 197, and the costs of 
maintaining the closed Northumberland plant for the first 
six months of 1997 to be $130,000, app. at 198, and that 
continued maintenance costs continue to be a terrible 
drain. 
 
The Board issued a consolidated complaint in August 
1996 (later amended in October 1996) charging Dorsey with 
numerous violations of the NLRA, including threatening 
employees with closure of the plant if the workers called a 
strike, refusing to provide company information necessary 
for bargaining, unilaterally implementing a new attendance 
policy, and refusing to fairly bargain regarding the transfer 
of work to Georgia. Following a three-day trial in November 
1996, the Administrative Law Judge issued a 
comprehensive fifty-six page decision on December 1, 1997, 
finding in large part that Dorsey committed the alleged 
unfair labor practices. See ALJ Decision, at 52. The ALJ's 
decision ordered a remedy that included the restoration of 
the Northumberland plant. Id. at 54-56. Dorsey filed 
exceptions to the decision on January 29, 1998, and the 
matter is currently pending before the Board. We were 
advised that briefing was completed recently. 
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Although the union had asked the Board to file a request 
for a S 10(j) injunction as early as November 1995, the 
Board did not file such a petition with the district court 
until January  27, 1997. In its Petition for a S 10(j) 
injunction, the Board sought to prevent Dorsey from selling 
or alienating the plant before the Board ruled on the merits 
of the underlying unfair labor charges. It sought to 
maintain the status quo and thereby preserve the remedy 
of restoration should the Board decide to so order. 
 
Following a hearing on July 24, 1997, the district court 
denied the petition request. Although the court found that 
there was reasonable cause to believe that Dorsey had 
committed the unfair labor charges, it also found that 
S 10(j) relief would not be "just and proper" because: (1) the 
request was untimely made, noting the fourteen-month 
delay in seeking S 10(j) relief; (2) the maintenance of the 
vacant plant was a cash drain on Dorsey, especially in light 
of the prior expenses of relocation; (3) the workers in 
Dorsey's Georgia and South Carolina plants could lose their 
jobs should restoration be ordered; (4) the vast majority of 
the former Northumberland workers had found new jobs; 
(5) the sale of the plant would bring new jobs to the region; 
and (6) the Board could order Dorsey to build a new plant 





A district court's determination whether to issue 
temporary injunctive relief under S 10(j) involves a two-fold 
inquiry: (1) whether there is reasonable cause to believe 
that an unfair labor practice has occurred; and (2) whether 
an injunction would be just and proper. See Pascarell v. 
Vibra Screw Inc., 904 F.2d 874, 877 (3d Cir. 1990) (citation 
omitted); Suburban Lines, 731 F.2d at 1078 (interim relief 
under S 10(j) may be granted without showing irreparable 
harm or a likelihood of success on the merits, the ordinary 
requisites of an injunction). Because Dorsey does not 
dispute the district court's finding that the Board has 
satisfied the "reasonable cause" inquiry, the only question 
is whether the Board demonstrated that the issuance of an 
injunction would be "just and proper." 
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The standard to be applied by a district court in 
determining whether granting temporary relief pursuant to 
S 10(j) is just and proper should be informed by the policies 
underlying S 10(j). See Lenape Products, 781 F.2d at 1003; 
Suburban Lines, 731 F.2d at 1090-91. "Congress sought to 
ensure that the Board would be able to exercise effectively 
its ultimate remedial power." Lenape Products, 781 F.2d at 
1003. Section 10(j) "was designed to enable the Labor 
Board to vindicate its ultimate remedial power by affording 
limited interim relief in instances where the passage of time 
reasonably necessary to adjudicate the case on its merits 
convinced both the Board and the federal courts that the 
failure to grant such relief might dissipate the effective 
exercise of such power." Suburban Lines, 731 F.2d at 1091. 
Thus, the focus in a S 10(j) determination is on the public 
interest, Vibra Screw, 904 F.2d at 876, and"the unusual 
likelihood . . . of ultimate remedial failure" by the NLRB. 
Suburban Lines, 731 F.2d at 1091 n.26 (emphasis in 
original). "The public interest at stake is the promotion of 
wholesome and mutually acceptable labor relations and the 
settlement of labor disputes through collective bargaining 
between employees and their employer." Vibra Screw, 904 
F.2d at 876 (citation and quotation marks omitted). 
 
In evaluating whether to issue an injunction under the 
"just and proper" prong, a district court"should discuss 
and determine whether the failure to grant interim 
injunctive relief would be likely to prevent the Board, acting 
with reasonable expedition, from effectively exercising its 
ultimate remedial powers." Suburban Lines, 731 F.2d at 
1091-92. "[T]he critical determination is whether, absent an 
injunction, the Board's ability to facilitate peaceful 
management-labor negotiation will be impaired." Vibra 
Screw, 904 F.2d at 879. This requires an assessment of 
"the likelihood of harm to the bargaining process" absent 
an injunction. Eisenberg v. Wellington Hall Nursing Home, 
Inc., 651 F.2d 902, 907 (3d Cir. 1981). "Unless there are 
circumstances, like the size, intimacy and longevity of the 
bargaining unit, which indicate that the bargaining process 
will not be harmed, courts must be deferential to the 
Board's determination that the integrity of the process 
needs interim protection." Vibra Screw, 904 F.2d at 879 
n.7. The S 10(j) analysis must be guided by the particular 
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facts in each case. See Eisenberg v. Hartz Mountain Corp., 
519 F.2d 138, 142 (3d Cir. 1975). 
 
The Board argues that the failure to issue the injunction 
in this case clearly impairs the "Board's ability to facilitate 
peaceful management-labor negotiation," Vibra Screw, 904 
F.2d at 879, because, absent an injunction, Dorsey could 
sell the plant before the Board rules upon the unfair labor 
charges. This would render the Board's ultimate remedial 
powers toothless. The ALJ has already determined that 
restoration of the plant is a proper remedy. Although 
Dorsey argues that restoration is not a proper remedy 
under these circumstances, but see Coronet Foods, Inc. v. 
NLRB, 981 F.2d 1284 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (court, per then 
Judge, now Justice, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, enforced Board 
order requiring employer to restore trucking department), 
we need not decide that issue now. Instead, this appeal 
concerns the district court's exercise of its discretion. It is 
evident to us that the district court's failure to grant 
interim injunctive relief to ensure the availability of the 
plant jeopardizes the Board's ability to effectively exercise 
its ultimate remedial powers. The alienation of the plant by 
Dorsey would eliminate that remedy entirely. Under the 
standards articulated in Suburban Lines, 731 F.2d at 1091- 
92, this risk is sufficient to satisfy the "just and proper" 
prong for injunctive relief. 
 
In addition, in denying injunctive relief, the district court 
relied upon its belief that the Board has the power to order 
Dorsey to build a new plant if the Board determined that 
restoration of the Northumberland plant was the proper 
remedy for the unfair labor charges. Dorsey cites no legal 
support, and significantly the Board argues it does not have 
such wide power. It is at least plausible that had the 
district court recognized that it was likely that a restoration 
remedy would be unavailable absent an injunction, the 
district court may have been persuaded to issue the interim 
relief. 
 
Another basis for the district court's opinion, that a vast 
majority of the workers from the Northumberland plant had 
found new jobs, is unsupported on this record. This 
conclusion was taken from a newspaper article that itself 
speculates as to this figure. Dorsey's counsel conceded at 
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oral argument that it neither presented nor has any 
evidence of the number of its former employees who are no 
longer available. Even if the district court's conclusion were 
accurate, there is no information whether the new jobs and 
pay are comparable. In any event, the possible employment 
of the former employees does not mitigate the need for a 
S 10(j) injunction. 
 
Moreover, the district court's denial of relief emphasized 
the cash drain and financial burden of maintenance of the 
Northumberland plant, and notes the negative impact 
caused by the relocation. This fails to take into account 
that the impact was of Dorsey's making. The Board's 
counsel points to evidence that shows that the burden is 
minor for a company of Dorsey's income and assets. Also 
significant in that respect is that in this circuit a S 10(j) 
injunction is limited to six months when a matter is 
pending before the Board. See Hartz Mountain, 519 F.2d at 
144. 
 
Finally, although we recognize that the Board did not 
petition for a S 10(j) injunction as early as it might have, the 
delay should not be dispositive in determining whether to 
grant injunctive relief. The district court acknowledged that 
"delay alone is not grounds for denying an injunction," op. 
at 10, but it is unclear whether its concern over the delay 
influenced the court's rejection of the injunction. Dorsey 
moved quickly from its decision to move the operations in 
the fall of 1995, to the closure of the plant on December 29, 
1995. Even if the Board had not delayed until January 
1997 to file the S10(j) petition, it is unlikely that it would 
have been able to seek the injunction and obtain a hearing 
before the equipment had been transferred and the plant 
closed. As we noted in Vibra Screw, "The Board needs time 
to do a thorough investigation before it even requests the 
[S 10(j)] injunction." 904 F.2d at 881. See also Aguayo v. 
Tomco Carburetor Co., 853 F.2d 744, 750 (9th Cir. 1988) 
(delay is only significant if the harm has occurred and the 
parties cannot be returned to the status quo; the Board 
needs a reasonable period of time to investigate and 
deliberate before it decides to bring a section 10(j) action) 
overruled on other grounds, Miller v. California Pacific Med. 
Ctr., 19 F.3d 449, 457 (9th Cir. 1994). 
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Although the protracted delay is not entirely justified, it 
is insufficient under these facts to overcome the primary 
consideration in evaluating the just and proper standard: 
that of safeguarding the Board's remedial powers. Using the 
Board's delay as the basis to deny the requested injunctive 
relief punishes the wronged employees for the Board's 
belated action, an unacceptable outcome. See Gottfried v. 
Mayco Plastics, 472 F. Supp. 1161, 1168 (E.D. Mich. 1979), 
aff 'd, 615 F.2d 1360 (6th Cir. 1980). Cf. NLRB v. J.H. 
Rutter-Rex Mfg. Co., 396 U.S. 258, 264-65 (1969) ("the 
Board is not required to place the consequences of its own 
delay, even if inordinate, upon wronged employees to the 
benefit of wrongdoing employers"). 
 
During the oral argument counsel for the Board advised 
this court that the issuance of a S 10(j) injunction 
invariably prompts the Board to review the ALJ decision on 
appeal because the Board is aware of the limited six-month 
duration of the injunction. See Hartz Mountain , 519 F.2d at 
144. Indeed, the Board has adopted a regulation requiring 
it to hear expeditiously and give priority to a complaint 





For the reasons set forth, we will remand this case and 
direct the district court to order interim relief under S10(j).1 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. Although we do not preclude Dorsey from raising on remand the 
appropriate starting date of the S 10(j) injunction, it is important to 
note 
that it never raised that issue in its brief. Our concurring colleague 
suggests that the Board has already obtained the relief it is seeking 
through the S 10(j) injunction. In fact, that has not occurred as the 
union and the former employees have not received the benefit of the 
Board's expedited consideration that occurs upon issuance of a S 10(j) 
injunction. 
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GREENBERG, Circuit Judge, concurring: 
 
I join in the majority opinion but point out the following. 
The Board seeks an injunction to prevent Dorsey from 
selling or alienating the plant before the Board rules on the 
merits of the unfair labor charges. If the district court had 
entered the injunction on August 26, 1997, when it instead 
denied it, the injunction already would have expired under 
the six-month limitation rule we adopted in Eisenberg v. 
Hartz Mountain Corp., 519 F.2d 138, 144 (3d Cir. 1975). Of 
course, in that circumstance the Board would have been 
required to hear the unfair labor practices complaint before 
it expeditiously on a priority basis. 
 
In fact, it is undisputed that Dorsey shut down the plant 
on December 29, 1995; and while it has attempted to sell 
the facility, it has been unable to do so. Moreover, its 
inability to sell the plant has been attributable at least in 
part to the Board's intervention, as the Board notified a 
potential purchaser that if it acquired the plant it might 
incur successor liability for Dorsey's alleged unfair labor 
practices. The notification understandably led to the 
potential sale collapsing. In reality, therefore, the mere fact 
that the Board brought the unfair labor practices charge 
has acted as a lis pendens on the property. Thus, even 
without an injunction having been entered, the status quo 
with respect to the alienation of the plant has been 
maintained for a period almost five-fold that which in Hartz 
Mountain we held could be required. 
 
The majority indicates that its opinion does "not preclude 
Dorsey from raising on remand the appropriate starting 
date of the S 10(j) injunction." Slip op. at 9 n.1. I, of course, 
agree. I write separately merely to emphasize that as I 
understand the majority's opinion it does not preclude 
Dorsey from arguing that the starting date should be 
August 26, 1997, so that the injunction already has 
expired. After all, the Board in a sense already has obtained 
the relief it is seeking in these proceedings. I, however, do 
not explore the point further as the parties have not briefed 
the starting date issue on this appeal. 
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